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DEFEAT: A MOTIVATION FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE?

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ABSTRACT

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The Department of Defense in many ways - and for many reasons - was not ready to fight and win during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The United States military didn't have the training, the procedures, or the proper resources to fight a counterinsurgency-type war. Still structured and resourced for conventional war, the Department of Defense (DoD) must change the course of its current transformation strategy or continue its poor record of dealing with terrorism and counterinsurgency. This paper will suggest two critical transformational changes required to maintain our military superiority. The most desperately-needed change is revamping the military personnel system to improve the way strategic leaders are developed. The second is developing an agency within the DoD that can fill the current void between military operations that defeat an enemy nation-state and assistance with the reconstruction of that society afterward. Without change, we can expect more situations like post-war Iraq, where in a country of 26 million people, conditions have deteriorated into an insurgency mixed with sectarian violence and where achieving a lasting "victory" with a predominantly military solution is proving not realistic or possible.

DEFEAT: A MOTIVATION FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE?

> The era of procrastinating, of half-measures, of soothing and baffling expedients, of delays, is coming to its close.   In its place we are entering a period of consequences.

> —Winston Churchill

    The Department of Defense in many ways - and for many reasons - was not ready to fight and win during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The United States military didn't have the training, didn't have the procedures, and didn't have the proper resources to fight a counterinsurgency-type war. With the United States military currently deployed in numerous hot spots around the world – taking casualties every day in Iraq – and with more threats developing on the horizon, it appears that the military is teetering on the verge of collapse. The current force structure and high operational tempo have left the Army overextended, overworked, discouraged, and unable to fight effectively where and when it is needed in the future unless dramatic transformational changes are made. U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces, have been stretched nearly to the breaking point by redeployments to Iraq, the attendant casualties, sagging recruitment, and accelerated wear on equipment.[1] The long-term commitment of American ground forces to Iraq at current levels is adversely affecting Army readiness, with less than a third of the Army units currently at high readiness levels.[2]

    It is widely acknowledged that the military effort to this point has not worked in Iraq, as U.S. and coalition forces remain bogged down in what appears to be a long, protracted war that is making no apparent real progress. The question then is, can the Department of Defense get out of the hole that has been dug and be ready to fight and win future wars? I say the answer is yes, but only if there are radical changes to the current philosophy on military leadership development; significant changes that I feel will create strategic thinkers and, eventually, form more capable military organizations. These changes must ultimately lead to more decentralized power and authority, enabling the Department of Defense to better achieve war-winning and peace-winning strategies.

    As a senior leader who has been part of our military system for over 20 years, I feel strongly that the Department of Defense must change the course of its current transformation strategy or pay a high price in dealing with future terrorism and counterinsurgency. This research paper will suggest two critical transformational changes required to maintain our military superiority well into the 21st Century. The most desperately-needed transformation change is revamping the current military personnel system to improve the way strategic leaders

are developed. The current system is out of step with the realities of modern war and the expectations of the men and women who are beginning to fill the ranks. The military must modernize its personnel system or risk the success of the modern voluntary force.[3]

The second transformational change, equally as important and to be implemented simultaneously with the first, is to develop an agency within the DoD that would fill the current gap between military operations defeating an enemy nation-state and assisting in the reconstruction of that society afterward. Between lethal warfighting operations and non-lethal stability operations, our national leaders devised an incomplete plan to defeat a perceived enemy nation-state by underestimating the reconstruction effort required in that society afterward. In Iraq, a country of 26 million people, post-war conditions have created an insurgency mixed with sectarian violence. Ultimate "victory" with a predominantly military solution is not achievable. This short-sighted strategy along with numerous administration misjudgments and missteps in execution led to a majority of the problems that have arisen; mistakes that contributed to the current post-war internal turmoil in Iraq and continue to fuel the increasing insurgency and unrest.

The Need for Change

The year 2007 presents a critical moral and cultural challenge for the military and a time for the Department of Defense to modify a transformation policy gone badly. The challenge is made even more daunting by the need for a new "Grand Strategy" in order for the United States to maintain its overwhelming military and economical global dominance. The initial strategic response to 9/11 combined ambitious public statements with vague particulars regarding the scope of the threat and the outcomes being sought. This combination of ambition and ambiguity has created important but unresolved tensions in American strategy. The lack of clarity in today's grand strategy is fast becoming intolerable.[4]

This new strategy must direct a course to defeat our enemies over the full spectrum of possible future contingencies. No longer should we focus on just winning battles, we must return to the idea of winning wars and how best to do that. This paradigm shift will require a major change in military policy. The national media has painted a dismal picture of the war in Iraq and defined it as un-winnable. Without a major course change and over time, this negative viewpoint may permeate the ranks of the military and lead to more difficulties in recruiting and retaining quality people across all services.   A natural consequence of this will be the military's inability to fully man the force with competent, trained, and qualified senior leaders. To minimize

this risk, it is necessary to implement institutional changes focused on redesigning Army leader development to meet both the challenges of military warfare and of strategic war.

Even to the casual observer, it is clear that both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom validated a new theory of warfare. To be precise, a new evolution in military warfare has developed in which Special Forces, high technology, and creative war plans replace traditional large-scale fire and maneuver forces when confronting an asymmetrical enemy. This new warfare strategy amounts to a revolution in military affairs that will require sweeping doctrinal changes in American defense policy for many years to come. This revolution must also encompass doctrinal changes in personnel management to ensure leaders are capable of fighting and winning not just the ongoing global war on terrorism, but all future conflicts.

While the military profession continues to receive high marks on major institutions' opinion polls,[5] there is a danger in resting on one's laurels. Laurels, after all, are very prickly things. There is no doubting the patriotism of our rank-and-file active and reserve military members. But what is in doubt is the ability of our senior military leaders to lead these transformational changes effectively. When reviewing today's conditions that impact military membership, the cracks in the armed forces personnel system are evident. Due to insufficient forces on the active or reserve rolls, service members must endure multiple combat tours with little dwell time. Also, equipment readiness rates are at near breaking points, and recruitment standards have been reduced to an all time low. The list could go on. The point is that without radical changes to many defense policies, there is a real risk that an implosion will occur with potentially devastating results to the security of our nation. Part of the fix to prevent this occurrence is to invest in our leader development and education programs, in order to produce the type of leaders who can function easily in a chaotic environment with little or no direct supervision. The military needs to part from its old, bureaucratic, conventional way of thinking and move in a new, networked, linear direction.

<u>New Direction</u>

So how does the Department of Defense go about improving itself after its poor performance during the Iraq war? There are at least two schools of thought to be considered: Return to the Powell doctrine of an overwhelming brute maneuver force; or stick with the "transforming" Rumsfeld doctrine of high-tech, lighter, faster, and more expeditionary. The correct answer is a blend of the two concepts, as each offer distinct advantages across a broad spectrum of options to defeat any credible enemy in future military operations. While many

wrestle with the "right mix" for shaping the future active/reserve force and combat power ratios, this paper will endeavor to tackle one of the inner workings of this giant military war machine, specifically leadership and its development. For it rests on the shoulders of senior military leaders to determine the overall success of any particular campaign or endeavor, no matter what the long term changes are to grand military strategy. Without first repairing the basic foundation of leadership development, we are subject to repeat the mistakes that led to the current quagmire called Operation Iraqi Freedom. Transformation is not just about new equipment or re-organization; it is also about the development of leaders. For the entire institutional redirection to be truly successful, the military must simultaneously transform its leaders. Pivotal to this transformation, is senior leadership's ability to adapt to a changing military.

This re-adjustment of leadership is the key to the long-term success of building strong organizations capable of meeting future adversarial challenges. "Building a 21st century military will require more than new weapons. It will also require a renewed spirit of innovation in our officer corps. We cannot reconfigure our military using old weapons and old plans. Nor can we do it with an old bureaucratic mind set that frustrates the creativity and entrepreneurship that a 21st century military will need."[6] As the military changes its force structure strategy for winning future wars, it must also change its strategy to maintain and develop quality leaders. Poor leadership results in a dysfunctional organizational culture, a lack of focus, and a lack of trust in senior leadership that has driven many people to make the decision to leave the service.[7] The quest then becomes to understand leadership and what causes leader ineffectiveness (toxicity) which ultimately evolves into a toxic workplace or worse, a zero-defects environment.

This theory of a toxic organizations being caused by toxic leaders is not a new one, as ascribed by Major Jon Hull, U.S. Marine Corps, in an article written in 1998:

> As unwavering as our expectation of integrity is, however, junior officers perceive a void between integrity and its relationship with candor. Too often candor is met with hostility, overreaction, is perceived as "malcontent," or interpreted as questioning a commander's decision. In actuality, candor should be not only encouraged but expected – if not demanded. It must be an integral part of any staff planning evolution and most important present as a commander formulates his decision. Once the commander makes his decision and puts it into action, continued candor remains vital – although it is never a means of justifying less than full and vigorous support of the commander. Integrity without candor, the "if you have nothing good to say, say nothing at all" approach, in no way prepares us for or wins wars. Its absence often leads to a "politically correct" interpretation of actions or events, facilitates the perpetuation of a flawed effort, or allows a re-infestation of micromanagement within the ranks. We are all quick to jump on the "people must be allowed to make mistakes" bandwagon, but too often we quietly caveat this with the thought, "As long as they're not my people."[8]

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The type of work environment Major Hull describes is not very conducive to producing a robust organization that's well prepared to win wars efficiently now or ever. Such a rigid work environment is a primary contributor to officer discontent, whether the organization is in a deployed or non-deployed status. As a whole, the military is facing now and will continue to face a retention problem in filling its leadership ranks. Despite recent initiatives of increased pay and benefits, most military leaders do not consider themselves mercenaries for hire and will not base their decisions to stay or not on financial reason alone. Most still believe in the same basic traditional and historical principles that caused them to join the military in the first place. So it is essential to correct this growing cultural disillusionment that is mislabeled as a "generation gap" and focus on eradicating this relatively recent phenomenon called toxic leadership.

Toxic Leadership = Toxic Organizations

The definition of a toxic leader can be summed up as someone who is risk-averse, lacks innovation, and cannot think out of the box. These toxic traits are contrary to the positive leadership traits that are essential to successfully lead organizations, and in a military context, to defeat all potential adversaries. Toxic leadership by its very definition harms people and will eventually lead to disabling any institution by suppressing risk-taking, enthusiasm and creative ideas, the life blood of any successful organization. To prevent this type of leadership in the armed forces, a complete reform of the military personnel management system is required. If there is no change, toxic leaders will continue to permeate the ranks and have an expanding negative impact on the organizations that they infect.

The current personnel system does not promote the type of free-thinking, aggressive, risk-taking leader needed to succeed in the future. Our present system essentially flows from reforms instituted at the turn of the 19th century by Secretary of War Elihu Root. Using the theories of Frederick Taylor and Max Weber about bureaucratic personnel systems and requirements, Root fought to replace a personnel system that was virtually unchanged since the Revolutionary War.[9] Secretary Root's reforms were absolutely right for their time. Unfortunately, they are now a hundred years old, but they still form the core of our personnel policies.[10]

The most damaging aspect of our manpower system is its purely top-down evaluation system. This system grooms people to function well in a ponderous, hierarchical bureaucracy. Each service member's promotion is based purely on the evaluation of his boss and his boss's boss. Thus, the system relies on this single top-down view to choose future leaders.[11] With our

vastly inflated performance evaluation systems, a single report that uses faint praise rather than enthusiastic endorsement will finish an officer's career. Thus, an innovative, risk-taking, outside-the-box officer needs to run into only one risk-averse, in-the-box, control-oriented boss to have his career terminated. To rise to the top, he has to be lucky enough not to serve under such an individual in decades of service. Mathematically, this system has to result in an ever more risk-averse population that promotes people like themselves.[12]

In a toxic leadership environment, people are rewarded for agreeing with the boss and are punished for thinking differently. In a toxic leadership environment, "yes" people are rewarded and are more likely to be promoted, while people who more fully engage their mental resources, critical thinking, and questioning skills are shut out from decision-making and positions of influence. The time is long overdue to fix our current hierarchical bureaucratic way of doing business if we are to continue leveraging open-minded leadership to find new ways of winning future wars.

A Better Future

There are several policy options that can prevent the development of toxic organizations. The first of these is to set term limits shorter than the prescribed mandatory retirement date in order to purge the ranks of toxic leadership. There is no need for toxic senior leaders to remain on active duty and continue infecting organizations when their level of positive contributions has peaked. There is a standard trajectory of effectiveness in which an officer progresses from induction through maturity, where the "Peter Principle" productivity plateau is eventually reached or worse, a decline is evident. These plateau conditions can lead to even more toxic behavior. More stringent early retirement review boards must be enacted to weed out the ranks of toxic leaders. Not only would these boards reduce top-heavy dead weight, but over time they should lessen the time for more productive junior officers to be promoted and move up to a position of their maximum efficiency.

Second, expand the latest trend of using 360-degree reviews to incorporate 360-degree evaluations. The current top-down evaluation, by itself, is not a good mechanism for providing a "total-picture" view of an officer, nor does it encourage those leadership traits necessary to win future wars. A combination of using 360-reviews and evaluations can help both the individual and ultimately the organization. The 360-review will provide leaders a clear perspective of their strengths and weaknesses as rated by their seniors, peers, and subordinates alike. The 360-evaluation will force leaders to not only impress their boss, but also not to step on their peers or subordinates in achieving their overall performance ratings.

Third, take advantage of senior leader experience by offering able retiring senior leaders respectable options commensurate with their years of selfless service. As the Department of Defense slowly migrates to a heavier dependency on outsourced manpower, these retirees would and should become viable candidates to fill those positions. Once a senior leader is approved for retirement, a one-year transition phase should kick-in whereby the individual is eased into retirement before he/she is officially removed from the active roles. For example, a multi-step process should be devised that provides adequate administrative support that serves the individual with an honorable structural transition. During this period, it could be requested that the former leader write about his/her overall leadership in the form of a personal monograph to be drawn upon by other leaders both active and reserve. Most importantly, this one year transition phase could be a time to coordinate options for retaining the future services of an able senior leader before his or her actual retirement date, thus taking full advantage of that individual's experience and not losing an important institutional knowledge source.

<u>Managing the Joint Officer</u>

The facts are in: most, if not all, future contingencies that involve the American military will be fought through joint operations. Therefore, joint leader development and education – personnel transformation – should have the highest priority in the overall military transformation process. Joint operations training must be introduced at the earliest stage of an officer's career-long learning path. It would not be too early for joint training to be introduced during the officer basic qualification course, given the importance of having a strong developmental foundation to build upon. One has only to visit Iraq briefly to recognize the complicated operations that require joint interoperability skills by junior officers in charge of small unit missions. These are skills that they must currently learn "on the job" rather than through the schoolhouse leader development process.

One of the keys in a successful individual career development plan under the present officer management system has been to take on a variety of assignments and to not stay in one place too long. By doing so, officers stay competitive with their peers and are ahead of those who homestead or single track in one field. The argument against such a diversified career development model is that it is difficult to mature bona-fide experts in any one field; you get "jack-of-all-trades" officers and masters of none, so-to-speak. This system in effect, focuses on creating an officer pool of proletarians by profession as they never have the opportunity to become anything more than generalists, preventing officers from ever reaching their full potential as strategic leaders.

To further develop future officers into effective transformational leaders, new training centers must be established that enhance individual development as effective decision-makers. Attendance at this new training center would be a next logical step after completing an intermediary school such as the U.S. Army Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. While the emphasis at JRTC is on unit cohesion, the new training center would be designed for and focused on the individual. Complex, 3-dimensional asymmetric simulators could provide the necessary training to produce highly proficient strategic decision-making leaders.

<u>Effective Transformational Leadership</u>

To be truly effective in the conduct of transformational contingency operations, military leaders must inherently possess or develop joint competencies/behaviors from their very first day on active duty. Marshall Sashkin originally based his Leader Behavior Questionnaire (LBQ) on the work of Warren Bennis, who studied ninety exceptional leaders.[13] In developing the LBQ, Sashkin describes five behavior categories of effective transformational leader behavior:

- **Clarity:** Sashkin's first category of transformational leadership behavior involves focusing the attention of others on key ideas, the most important aspects of the leader's vision. In practice, this means for example, coming up with metaphors and analogies that make abstract ideas clear and vivid.[14]

- **Communication:** The second behavior includes skills such as active listening and giving and receiving feedback effectively. These actions ensure clear communication.[15]

- **Consistency**: Leaders establish trust by taking actions that are consistent over time and with what the leader says. Trust, of course, exists in the minds and hearts of followers and is not an obvious aspect of leader behavior. But consistency over time and between words and actions produces trust in followers.[16]

- **Caring:** The fourth behavior is demonstrating respect and concern for people. Psychologist Carl Rogers called this behavior "unconditional positive regard." By this he meant caring about and respecting another person regardless of one's feelings or judgments about that person's actions. Caring is shown not just by "big" actions such as ensuring job security but also by many everyday actions, such as remembering people's birthdays or even something as basic as learning and using their names.[17]

- **Creating opportunities:** Bennis originally associated this behavior with risk taking and risk avoidance, but the underlying issue is more complicated. Transformational

leaders empower followers by allowing them to accept challenges taking on and "owning" a new project, for example. But transformational leaders also plan ahead and do not ask more of followers than they know the followers are capable of. Followers might honestly feel a sense of risk in accepting a challenge, but a transformational leader does everything possible to ensure that any risk is relatively low and that with the right resources, as well coaching and mentoring, the follower can be successful.[18]

So what is effective transformational leadership? It's mastering the above behavioral categories while developing leadership behavior traits that promote a positive organizational climate. The behaviors that transformational leaders engage in to help foster an organizational climate that facilitates creative thinking include:

- Being open to change
- Involving followers in problem-solving efforts
- Responding positively to new ideas
- Being supportive of new ideas
- Encouraging debate and entertaining different perspectives
- Allowing freedom and autonomy, not being controlling
- Encouraging risk-taking and accepting failure[19]

Learning and employing constructive leadership behavioral skills can be the catalyst to drive and embrace change. It will require this type of "open minded" transformational leader to re-engineer and implement the outdated federal organizational structures, policies, and practices that exist today.

Transformed Capability

In the past decade the United States has been transforming its military force and adopting new concepts of combat operations. The focus has been on rapid and decisive operations and, more recently, on preemption.[20] The flaws in this combat-focused strategy became quite evident after the decisive victory over the Iraqi military during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The collapse of the enemy's military much more quickly than had been typical of past combat operations resulted in the United States being caught without a mature plan for post-conflict operations and without an adequate complement of the skills needed to begin reconstruction promptly. The resultant gap left U.S. forces without an adequate response to the disorder that followed the defeat of enemy forces.[21] A new transformation agency tasked with planning and

executing post-conflict operations is absolutely required to provide for a smooth transition between the lethal and non-lethal phases of a campaign and in the end, winning the peace.

Securing the peace in the aftermath of conflict depends on many factors: how much damage is inflicted on a region's infrastructure; how many civilians unconnected to the local regime are killed or injured; and how much regional instability is created by a long military campaign. These all shape the prospects for success in the post-conflict environment. Consequently, planning for military operations must begin with a clear, attainable, political-military objective that includes an understanding of what the postwar setting must look like when combat operations end and post-conflict operations begin.[22] To achieve an overall strategic victory, equal emphasis must be applied to both combat and post-conflict stability operations and they must be fully integrated from start to finish. The new agency responsible for this action should not and must not be an out-of-pocket organization. It needs to be an approved and fully-funded organic structure with the right blend of assigned military and civilian personnel to meet all the demands of post-conflict stability operations.

To assist this agency with post-conflict operations, counter-insurgency militias could be created to augment military efforts after the bulk of the conventional forces have left. These local defense forces could provide a critical lever for separating the [insurgents] from the population. Militia commanders know their own community better than any outsider . . .[23] Even if they don't know who the [insurgents] are right away, they can build local intelligence networks from the social contacts they already have.[24] The rapid creation or recognition of an effective local militia force would be advantageous to community stabilization, begin a smooth process of restoring a full and sovereign government, and expedite the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces. The challenge will be in preventing independent or unrecognized militias that might operate outside the control of the legitimate government from emerging, and having a plan to deal with them if they do.

Winning Future Wars

In order to maintain our decisive edge over potential future enemies, the Defense Department must change its organizational "western culture" preoccupation with the idea that all wars can be won by just having better technology. Our ability to be successful in winning future wars is not just by developing the best technology and safeguarding it; history has proven that a not very successful strategy. In the end, technology does not solve problems; people do.[25] A person's ability to better influence a capability during conflict, whether in a game of chess or on a battlefield, can determine victory or defeat. Capability is not created by just high-tech

gadgets. According to General Sir Rupert Smith, capability is a product of three things: what you have, the way you use it, and your will to use it. That applies as much to a nation-state as it does to a gladiator in the ring. And the thing to remember is that your capability is always relative. It is a relationship. It is your capability in relation to your opponent.[26]

Success lies within the organization, its management, and its bureaucracy.   The key is having a governmental structure that allows us to take advantage of technology which is available to everyone. It's about having a structure that realizes the potential inherent in available technology and then use it to its best advantage. The point being, if you are able to outthink your adversaries, you are then likely able to outfight them. Military strategists require a free hand by the civilian leadership in order to take advantage of the potential of new technology when drawing up war plans. It all boils down to effectively leveraging technology more than your adversaries; in other words, having a more effective organization than the enemy.

The trend over the last several decades has been based upon the premise that "bigger is better:" larger and more sophisticated governmental entities; bigger bureaucracies; and mightier military power. It hasn't been towards decentralization, but continues towards centralization. On the other hand, the availability of instant information argues for the opposite tack. The monopoly on information once held by only a few at the top of a rigid hierarchy has been destroyed by the proliferation of computers, cell phones, and other kinds of information technology. Successful organizations have become networked and gotten "flatter." What has happened in the business world over the last few decades shows that companies that can adapt their organizations to these technological changes are successful. Large companies like Ford, General Motors or U.S. Steel, which worked very well in the industrial age, don't work very well in the information age because they're still tied to rigid top-down bureaucracies. These large companies are not well-suited for the demands of competition today, as opposed to other large corporations such as Microsoft, Toyota, and EBay, whose advantage doesn't come from better technology, but from having better management systems.[27]

The U.S. government is the Ford or General Motors of world governments. It's the old lumbering bureaucracy that was effective and worked very well in World War-II and the Cold War, but it doesn't work so well now. It's got layers upon layers of bureaucracy that make it very hard to move as quickly as our enemies who are flexible and agile; who are networked and don't have a large bureaucracy to contend with. In many ways, al Qaeda is the EBay of terrorism. They have a structure that is better suited for the modern age than we are.

The good news, from the American perspective, is that many potential enemies (e.g., China and North Korea) are encumbered by even more inflexible bureaucracies. The bad news

is that this is not true of nimble networked terrorist cells. To fight them effectively, the U.S. military will have to display more of the decentralized decision-making that it showed in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. This will not be easy though, because modern command and control technology is a two-edged sword: It can be used to centralize or decentralize. It will always be difficult for a senior military or political leader to resist the temptation to micromanage operations from afar, a style of leadership that modern communications technology has made easier, but no more effective, than in the past.[28]

Veteran journalist Robert Kaplan rightly calls "the dinosauric, vertical bureaucracy of the Industrial Age . . . the greatest single impediment to America's ability to wage a successful worldwide counter-insurgency." Unless the U.S. government can streamline its Industrial Age bureaucracy and become a networked organization, it may find that even purchasing the latest and best technology will not offer sufficient protection against the country's foes.[29]

Conclusions and Recommendations

U.S. armed forces will likely remain engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. They will also need to remain involved in deterrence missions in the Western Pacific, most notably regarding the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. The United States will wish to remain strongly engaged in European security as well, less because of threats to the region, but because most of America's main security partners are located there. The maintained strength, capabilities, and cohesion of the members of the NATO alliance have important global implications for the United States.[30]

But the United States does not know what, if any, major new wars it may have to wage in the coming years. It does not know whether its relations with the People's Republic of China will continue to improve or again worsen, raising even the possibility of war over Taiwan. It does not know whether the current nuclear "crisis" with North Korea will be resolved peacefully. It cannot predict whether any other countries will allow their territories to be used by terrorist organizations bent on attacking the United States. It must contend with the remarkable degree of animosity toward the United States among most Muslim countries, particularly in the Arab world, which, though it predated President George W. Bush's administration, has worsened considerably in recent years. Additional military scenarios could be of immense importance as well. Nuclear-armed Pakistan could wind up in either civil conflict or war against nuclear-armed India. Iran could threaten Persian Gulf shipping or threaten Israel with the nuclear arsenal it seems bent on acquiring. Saudi Arabia's stability could be called into question.[31]

The sort of lethal enemies we confront today and will continue to confront into the future will be those that can defeat us not with AK-47's, but with TV cameras. They will be much more adept in taking advantage of the information operations and strategic communication components of warfare and using them against us to win the battle of international perceptions. The U.S. will need to figure out how to compete effectively against our enemies in the information age of 24/7 internet and satellite television coverage. If not, the long term cost could be catastrophic and we will encounter the fate of previous great powers that failed to adjust to technological changes in warfare. All of these risks can be neutralized or at least minimized by changing our organizational structure correctly to develop non-toxic leaders who can overcome the information operations challenge.

Not addressing the way we conduct business in the Department of Defense and the military today will negatively impact the future. Failure to deal resolutely with the complex transformation issues facing us will only promote continued ineptitude in dealing with future adversaries. As in all wars, new ways of doing business more effectively and efficiently emerge. Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom are no different when one evaluates all the lessons learned. The challenge for the Defense Department and military senior leadership is to embrace this revolution in military affairs right now. By combining new technology with new doctrine, new tactics with new strategy, and above all revamping the military personnel system, we can change the face of battle with more efficient national strategy policies. There has been a quantum increase in the effectiveness of military technology since 9/11. Every effort should be made to take full advantage of these technologically-advanced capabilities by creating an environment in which leaders feel free to offer independent advice in making strategic decisions. The DoD leadership should emphasize training and education programs in order to "reset" the force and restore the U.S. military to a higher level of readiness. By doing so, it will have long term positive implications for the future of American power and winning the global war on terrorism. DoD should not be content with just learning this expensive lesson, it must act on this knowledge.

Endnotes

[1] James A. Baker III, and Lee H. Hamilton, *The Iraq Study Group Report,* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2006), 50.

[2] Ibid.

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